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Abstract
Consider a research lab that owns a patent on a new technology but cannot
develop a marketable final product based on the new technology. There are
two downstream firms that might successfully develop the new product. If the
downstream firms’ benefits from being the sole supplier of the new product
are private information, the research lab will sometimes sell two licences, even
though under complete information it would have sold one exclusive licence.
This is in contrast to the standard result that a monopolist will sometimes
serve less, but never more buyers when there is private information.
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1 Introduction
Consider a research lab that has patented a new technology and is thus in a
monopolistic situation. It is specialized in basic research and does not have
the ability to develop and produce a marketable final product that is based on
the new technology. However, there are two downstream firms that have such
abilities. Each of these downstream firms could with a certain probability
be successful in developing the new product, provided it gets a license from
the monopolist. A downstream firm enjoys a private benefit if it is the sole
supplier of the new product. However, if the monopolist sells licences to
both firms, then both may successfully develop the new product, in which
case they enjoy no benefits due to competition. Hence, the monopolist may
be able to achieve a higher revenue if he or she sells an exclusive licence to
one downstream firm only.
The problem of a monopolistic research lab that can license an inno-
vation to firms that are competitors in a downstream market has received
considerable attention in the literature.1 Following Katz and Shapiro [15],
it is assumed here that each downstream firm has use for only one unit of
the input (only one licence for a given patent) and that the upstream mo-
nopolist can provide the input at zero cost (i.e., the costs of making the
innovation have already been expended). Yet, Katz and Shapiro [15] assume
that the downstream firms are identical and that there is complete informa-
tion. In contrast, in the present paper the downstream firms do not need to
be identical and the focus is on the eﬀects of the downstream firms’ private
information about their benefits.2
1For example, see Kamien and Tauman [10, 11], Katz and Shapiro [14, 15], Kamien,
Tauman, and Zang [13], Rockett [25], Kamien, Oren, and Tauman [12], and Bousquet,
Cremer, Ivaldi, and Wolkowicz [2]. For surveys, see Reinganum [23] and Kamien [9].
2Given the fact that there is a large literature on licensing, it is surprising that almost
all papers in this literature assume complete information. Two exceptions are Gallini
and Wright [5] and Beggs [1]. However, the focus of these papers is quite diﬀerent. In
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The eﬀects of introducing private information about the buyers’ valua-
tions in models of monopolistic supply of (private or public) goods are by
now well understood.3 In accordance with this literature it turns out that
the monopolist will sometimes sell no licence at all, which would never hap-
pen under complete information. However, the peculiar economics of selling
licences lead to an interesting conclusion that is in contrast to the standard
results on profit-maximizing mechanisms under private information. It will
be demonstrated that there are circumstances under which a monopolist sells
two licences under private information, while he or she would have sold an
exclusive licence to one firm under complete information. This is interest-
ing since usually private information distorts the number of buyers served
downwards, but not upwards.4
Intuitively, the reason is as follows. Consider a monopolist who sells a
usual private good to two potential buyers with unit demand. The monop-
olist wants the buyers to reveal their valuations. However, a buyer with a
high valuation is tempted to claim that his or her valuation is low in order
to reduce the payment he or she has to make. Therefore, the monopolist
threatens to reduce the quantity that a buyer can expect to receive when he
or she announces a low valuation. Such a reduction hurts a buyer with a high
valuation more than a buyer with a low valuation, so that truthful revela-
particular, they analyze signaling models, while the present paper studies an adverse
selection problem.
3See, for instance, the survey of Fudenberg and Tirole [4, chapter 7] and the literature
cited there.
4See Myerson [20] and Bulow and Roberts [3] for the case of a monopolist selling private
goods, Güth and Hellwig [6] and Rob [24] for monopolistic supply of public goods, and
Schmitz [26] for monopolistic provision of excludable public goods. Moreover, note that in
the case of bilateral trading analyzed by Myerson and Satterthwaite [22], ineﬃciency only
arises because there are situations where under complete information trade would occur,
but the good is not traded under asymmetric information. See McKelvey and Page [17]
for results regarding the direction of ineﬃciency in bilateral bargaining over trade of a
divisible good.
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tion can be induced.5 In contrast, when selling licences, the monopolist can
induce truthful revelation not only by threatening to reduce the probability
that a buyer who claims to have a low valuation receives a license, but also
by the threat of selling a licence to the other buyer, too. Hence, in some
states of the world private information can lead to an increase in the number
of licenses sold.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper which shows that
private information can distort the number of buyers that are served by a
monopolist upwards, provided that the reservation utilities are exogenously
given. It is by now well known that upward distortions of the quantity traded
can occur if reservation utilities are type-dependent. This follows from Lewis
and Sappington’s [16] seminal paper on countervailing incentives.6 However,
in contrast to this literature and in accordance with the standard adverse
selection models, in the present paper a buyer’s utility net of his or her
reservation utility is always increasing in his or her type, independent of
the quantity sold. A main finding of Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti [7]
is that in their model (where the seller has only one object) under asym-
metric information a sale may occur even if eﬃciency requires that the good
stays with the seller. While they assume that there are multi-dimensional
types and that reservation utilities are endogenous and type-dependent, the
present paper demonstrates that no such assumptions are necessary in order
5Notice that if the monopolist has only one good to sell, a reduction of the quantity
that a buyer expects to receive can also be achieved if the good is given to the other buyer.
When the distributions of the buyers’ valuations are not identical, it may thus happen that
under private information buyer 1 receives the good, while under symmetric information
buyer 2 would get the good (see Myerson [20]). Hence, the quantity received by buyer
1 is distorted upwards. However, it is always true that there is no state of the world in
which the monopolist sells more under private information than he or she would sell under
symmetric information.
6See Jullien [8] for a comprehensive analysis of principal-agent problems with type-
dependent reservation utilities.
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to create an upward distortion in the number of sales. Segal [27] discusses
a general (complete information) model of contracting with externalities. In
his wording, the model of Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti [7] depends on
“externalities on non-traders”, while there are no such externalities in the
present paper.
As an illustration, imagine that the new technology patented by the mo-
nopolist might be the basis for developing a newmedicament against a disease
that so far could not be cured (or that could only be treated with medicine
that is supplied competitively). In this case it makes sense to assume that
if only one firm gets a license or is successful in developing the new product,
there are no external eﬀects on the other firm.7
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following sec-
tion, the basic model is introduced and the complete information benchmark
case is analyzed. In Section 3, private information is introduced and the main
result is derived. Concluding remarks follow in Section 4. Some technical
details have been relegated to the appendix.
2 The model
Consider a monopolist who can sell licences to two potential buyers (down-
stream firms). If downstream firm i ∈ {1, 2} gets an exclusive licence, it can
develop a marketable final product with probability pi ∈ (0, 1), so that its
profits are given by piBi − ti, where Bi are the benefits from being the sole
supplier of the final product and ti denotes the payment to the monopolist.
If the monopolist sells licences to both buyers, then the profits of firm i are
given by pi(1− pj)Bi − ti, with j 6= i. Hence, if both downstream firms are
successful in developing the final product (which happens with probability
7Moreover, note that it may well be that there is only a small number of pharmaceutical
firms that have the know-how and the capacities to develop the new product, and the
potential licensees may well be known to have diﬀerent probabilities of success.
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pipj), there are no benefits from being the sole supplier of the new product.8
Assume that B1 ∈ [0, B1] and B2 ∈ [0, B2] are independently distributed
random variables and that the distribution functions Fi are continuously
diﬀerentiable. Denote the corresponding density functions by fi. Let qi ∈
[0, 1] denote the probability that buyer i gets an exclusive licence, and let
q12 ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that both buyers each get a licence. Obviously,
0 ≤ q1 + q2 + q12 ≤ 1 must hold. Firm i’s payoﬀ is hence given by
ui = qipiBi + q12(1− pj)piBi − ti.
Following the mechanism design literature, it is assumed that the monop-
olist has full bargaining and commitment power, so that he or she can make a
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the downstream firms. The firms can then accept
or reject the monopolist’s oﬀer. If a firm rejects the oﬀer, the parties re-
ceive their reservation utilities which are normalized to zero. Otherwise, the
licences are provided and payments are made according to the mechanism.
As a benchmark, consider first the case of complete information. The
following proposition characterizes the monopolist’s optimal licencing strat-
egy, i.e. the profit-maximizing choice of q = (q1, q2, q12) depending upon the
realizations of B1 and B2.
Proposition 1 The monopolist’s optimal licencing strategy under complete
information is given by
q =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1, 0, 0) if B2 < B1min
n
p1
p2
, p1
1−p1
o
,
(0, 1, 0) if B2 > B1max
n
p1
p2
, 1−p2p2
o
,
(0, 0, 1) otherwise.
Proof. The monopolist maximizes his or her profits t1 + t2 subject to the
firms’ participation constraints ui ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, 2}, and 0 ≤ q1 + q2 + q12 ≤ 1.
8The structure of the payoﬀs has been chosen to be as simple as possible. Of course, the
case in which the downstream firms’ willingness-to-pay for a license depends on additional
profits that are verifiable could be dealt with in a straightforward way.
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The participation constraints must hold with equality, since the monopolist
would increase ti if ui > 0. Hence, ti = qipiBi + q12(1− pj)piBi, so that the
monopolist maximizes
2X
i=1
¡
qipiBi + q12(1− pj)piBi
¢
= q1p1B1 + q2p2B2 + q12 [(1− p2)p1B1 + (1− p1)p2B2]
subject to 0 ≤ q1 + q2 + q12 ≤ 1. It is straightforward to verify that this
expression is maximized by q as characterized in the proposition. For in-
stance, if p2B2 > p1B1 and p2B2 > (1 − p2)p1B1 + (1 − p1)p2B2, so that
B2 > max{p1p2B1,
1−p2
p2
B1}, then q2 = 1 is optimal. The other cases follow in
an analogous way. Finally, notice that the transfer payments ti can easily be
calculated using the binding participation constraints ui = 0.
In the case of complete information, the monopolist can extract the total
gains from trade.9 A downstream firm gets an exclusive license if its benefit
from being the sole supplier of the new product is suﬃciently larger than the
other firm’s benefit. Moreover, ceteris paribus a firm gets a license in more
states of the world if its probability of success is increased. Notice that the
monopolist will never give both downstream firms licences if p1 + p2 > 1.10
As an illustration of the optimal mechanism, consider the example dis-
played in Figure 1.11 The figure shows which firm gets a licence in the
case p1 = 12 and p2 =
2
5
for all possible realizations of B1 and B2, when
B1 = B2 = 1.
9Note that the monopolist could also extract the total gains from trade if only the
downstream firms were symmetrically informed, but the monopolist did not know the
firms’ willingness-to-pay. This follows from the literature on (subgame perfect) Nash
implementation, see Moore and Repullo [19] and Moore [18].
10This is a straightforward generalization of the obvious fact that a monopolist will never
sell more than one license to Bertrand competitors if there is no further development stage
(i.e., if p1 = p2 = 1). See e.g. Kamien [9].
11In the figure, (1) means that buyer 1 gets an exclusive license, (2) means that buyer
2 gets an exclusive license, and (12) means that both buyers get a license each.
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Figure 1. Optimal licensing strategy under complete information.
3 Private information
Now assume that the realizations of B1 and B2 are private information of
the downstream firms 1 and 2, respectively. According to the revelation
principle (see e.g. Myerson [21]), the monopolist can confine his or her search
for an optimal mechanism to the class of direct revelation mechanisms. A
direct mechanism (q(B), t1(B), t2(B)) determines the licencing decisions and
the transfer payments as functions of the firms’ reports about their benefits
B = (B1, B2). The mechanism must be constructed so that in equilibrium
the firms are induced to reveal their private information truthfully. Following
most of the Bayesian mechanism design literature, attention will be confined
to what Myerson [20] called the regular case, i.e. it will be assumed that the
so-called virtual benefit vi(Bi) = Bi − 1−Fi(Bi)fi(Bi) is monotonically increasing.
12
12Note that it is suﬃcient that the well-known monotone hazard rate condition
d
dBi
1−Fi
fi
< 0 holds. See e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole [4, chapter 7] and the literature
discussed there.
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Proposition 2 In the case of private information, it is optimal for the mo-
nopolist to choose the following licensing strategy:
q =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(0, 0, 0) if max {v1(B1), v2(B2)} < 0
(1, 0, 0) if max {v2(B2), 0} < v1(B1)min
n
p1
p2
, p1
1−p1
o
(0, 1, 0) if v2(B2) > max {v1(B1), 0}max
n
p1
p2
, 1−p2p2
o
(0, 0, 1) otherwise
Proof. Define qi = qi + (1 − pj)q12, where i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. Firm i’s
(interim) expected payoﬀ can then be written as
Ui(Bi) = Ej [qi(B)piBi − ti(B)] ,
where Ej denotes the expectation operator with respect to Bj. The monop-
olist maximizes his or her expected profits E(t1 + t2) subject to the firms’
(interim) participation constraints Ui(Bi) ≥ 0,∀i, ∀Bi, the firms’ Bayesian
incentive compatibility constraints
Ui(Bi) ≥ Ej
h
qi(B˜i, Bj)piBi − ti(B˜i, Bj)
i
∀i,∀Bi,∀B˜i, and 0 ≤ q1+q2+q12 ≤ 1. The incentive compatibility constraints
mean that it is rational for firm i to reveal its private information truthfully
given that firm j 6= i tells the truth.
The following lemma is a straightforward application of standard Bayesian
mechanism design techniques and is proved in the appendix.
Lemma 1 The mechanism (q(B), t1(B), t2(B)) is Bayesian incentive com-
patible if and only if Ej(qi(B)) is non-decreasing in Bi and firm i’s (interim)
expected payoﬀ satisfies Ui(Bi) = Ui(0) +
R Bi
0
piEj
£
qi(Bˇi, Bj)
¤
dBˇi.
Given incentive compatibility, firm i’s expected payment hence satisfies
E[ti] = E [qi(B)piBi − Ui(Bi)]
= E
∙
qi(B)piBi −
Z Bi
0
piEj
£
qi(Bˇi, Bj)
¤
dBˇi
¸
− Ui(0)
= E
∙
qi(B)pi
µ
Bi −
1− Fi(Bi)
fi(Bi)
¶¸
− Ui(0),
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where the last line follows from partial integration. By Lemma 1, firm i’s
participation constraint is satisfied whenever Ui(0) ≥ 0 holds. Hence, the mo-
nopolist will set Ui(0) = −E[ti(0, Bj)] = 0, so that his or her total expected
profits (using the definition of qi) are given by
E
"
2X
i=1
¡
qi + (1− pj)q12
¢
pivi(Bi)
#
.
The monopolist chooses q such that this expression is maximized, subject to
0 ≤ q1+q2+q12 ≤ 1 and the constraint that Ej(qi(B)) is non-decreasing inBi.
Ignoring the monotonicity constraint, it is straightforward to verify that the
licensing rule q characterized in the proposition maximizes the monopolist’s
expected profits. In particular, if v1(B1) < 0 and v2(B2) < 0 it is obviously
optimal to choose q1 = q2 = q12 = 0. Moreover, q1 = 1 is optimal if either
v2(B2) < 0 < v1(B1) or else if p1v1(B1) > p2v2(B2) > 0 and p1v1(B1) > (1−
p2)p1v1(B1) + (1− p1)p2v2(B2). The other cases can be handled analogously.
Next, it must be checked that the omitted monotonicity constraint is satisfied.
This is the case, since by assumption vi(Bi) is increasing and hence, when
Bi is increased, then qi(B) can never decrease (it can increase from 0 to
1 or from 0 to 1 − pj to 1). Finally, note that only the expected transfer
payments Ej(ti) are determined by Lemma 1. The actual payments could
e.g. be chosen such that
ti = qi(B)piBi −
Z Bi
0
piqi(Bˇi, Bj)dBˇi.
Notice that in the proof of Proposition 2, the transfer payments ti have
been determined such that a downstream firm only has to make a payment
if it actually gets a licence, which seems to be plausible. Obviously, under
incomplete information the monopolist can no longer extract the total sur-
plus. Furthermore, notice that (as was the case under complete information)
the monopolist never sells licences to both firms if p1 + p2 > 1.
10
As an illustration, consider again the example of the previous section,
where p1 = 12 and p2 =
2
5
. Assume that F1(B1) = B1 and F2(B2) = 2B2−B22 .
The optimal licensing decisions of the monopolist are illustrated in Figure
2.13
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Figure 2. Optimal licensing strategy under incomplete information.
It is interesting to compare now the optimal licensing strategies un-
der complete and under incomplete information. Consider Figure 3, which
merges Figures 1 and 2. Notice that in regions A, C, and E the same licensing
decisions are made in both scenarios. Moreover, there are regions (F, G, H) in
which one or two licences would be sold under complete information, but no
licence is sold under incomplete information. There are also circumstances in
which one firm would be served under complete information, while another
firm is served under incomplete information (region I), and where private
information leads to the trade of one exclusive licence instead of two licences
(region B). These conclusions are well in line with standard results on the
eﬀects of introducing private information in monopolistic pricing problems.
13In the figure, (0) means that no license is sold.
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However, the economics of selling licences can also lead to an interesting con-
clusion that is in contrast to the usual results: In region D only firm 1 would
get a licence under complete information, while both firms get a licence under
incomplete information. Hence, there are situations in which more licences
are sold due to private information. Intuitively, a buyer can as usual be
deterred from understating his or her willingness-to-pay by the threat of a
lower probability of getting the good. In the present context, however, the
threat may also take the form of not getting an exclusive licence (but still
one of two licences sold). The threat that the other firm also gets a license
is again more harmful for a firm with a high benefit, because such a firm has
to lose more. As usual, even though the monopolist would prefer not to do
so once he or she knows the buyers’ types, in order to be eﬀective the threat
must actually be executed in some states of the world.
10.80.60.40.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
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D
B
C
E
FG
H
B1
I
Figure 3. In region D more licences are sold under incomplete information.
Hence, the following result has been demonstrated.
Corollary 1 In some states of the world, it can be optimal for the monopolist
to sell two licenses in the presence of private information, while he or she
would sell only one license under complete information.
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4 Conclusion
It has been shown that a profit-maximizing monopolist may sell more licenses
under asymmetric information than he or she would sell under complete
information. This result is in stark contrast to the standard result saying
that in traditional models of adverse selection the quantity sold is always
distorted downwards. Moreover, in contrast to some related findings in the
recent literature and in accordance with the standard model, the upward
distortion has been derived here in a model in which reservation utilities are
exogenously given.
The model has been kept as simple as is consistent with making the main
point. It is obvious that the model could be generalized to more than two
downstream firms in a straightforward way. A somewhat more interesting
generalization might be the introduction of additional private information
regarding the success probabilities. Another possible extension could be the
consideration of less sharp competition, so that a success is still beneficial
for a firm even if it is it not the sole supplier of the new product. While
such extensions would certainly complicate the exposition and might veil the
simple intuition underlying the basic insight, the main eﬀect highlighted in
this paper should still continue to be relevant.
13
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
“Only if”: The incentive compatibility conditions can be written as
Ui(Bi) = Ej [qi(B)piBi − ti(B)] ≥ Ej
h
qi(B˜i, Bj)piBi − ti(B˜i, Bj)
i
,
Ui(B˜i) = Ej
h
qi(B˜i, Bj)piB˜i − ti(B˜i, Bj)
i
≥ Ej
h
qi(B)piB˜i − ti(B)
i
,
which implies
Ej [qi(B)pi]
³
Bi − B˜i
´
≥ Ui(Bi)− Ui(B˜i) ≥ Ej
h
qi(B˜i, Bj)pi
i³
Bi − B˜i
´
.
Hence, Ej [qi(B)]
³
Bi − B˜i
´
≥ Ej
h
qi(B˜i, Bj)
i³
Bi − B˜i
´
, so that Ej [qi(B)]
must be non-decreasing in Bi.Moreover, assume w.l.o.g. that Bi > B˜i, divide
the chain of inequalities by Bi− B˜i, and let B˜i converge to Bi in order to see
that U 0i(Bi) = Ej [qi(B)pi] almost everywhere. Hence,
Ui(Bi) = Ui(0) +
Z Bi
0
piEj
£
qi(Bˇi, Bj)
¤
dBˇi.
“If”: It has to be shown that
∆(Bi) = Ui(Bi)−Ej
h
qi(B˜i, Bj)piBi − ti(B˜i, Bj)
i
≥ 0.
Using
Ui(Bi) = Ui(B˜i) +
Z Bi
B˜i
piEj
£
qi(Bˇi, Bj)
¤
dBˇi
and Ej
h
ti(B˜i, Bj)
i
= Ej
h
qi(B˜i, Bj)piB˜i
i
− Ui(B˜i), it is straightforward to
see that
∆(Bi) = Ej
h
qi(B˜i, Bj)
i
pi
³
B˜i −Bi
´
+
Z Bi
B˜i
piEj
£
qi(Bˇi, Bj)
¤
dBˇi
= piBi
³
Ej [qi(B)]−Ej
h
qi(B˜i, Bj)
i´
−
Z Bi
B˜i
piBˇi
µ
d
dBˇi
Ej
£
qi(Bˇi, Bj)
¤¶
dBˇi
=
Z Bi
B˜i
pi(Bi − Bˇi)
µ
d
dBˇi
Ej
£
qi(Bˇi, Bj)
¤¶
dBˇi ≥ 0.
The inequality follows since Ej
£
qi(Bˇi, Bj)
¤
is non-decreasing in Bˇi.
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